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DELIVERY OF GOODS IN THE CUSTODY OF A THIRD PARTY: 
OPERATION AND BASIS 
 
Craig Anderson* 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 
(1) Significance and basis of delivery of moveables 
 
The common law required delivery for the transfer of ownership of corporeal 
moveable property. This requirement was, however, abolished for sales of corporeal 
moveables by the Sale of Goods Act 1893,1 although a limited role for delivery is 
retained in certain circumstances.2 Accordingly, delivery is no longer required in the 
great majority of transfers of corporeal moveables. However, delivery is still needed 
in any transfer for no monetary consideration, such as a gift or an exchange. 
Possession remains important in the creation of rights in security over corporeal 
moveable property.3 This point extends also to any "transaction in the form of a 
contract of sale which is intended to operate by way of mortgage, pledge, charge, or 
other security", such transactions being excluded from the Sale of Goods Act 1979.4 
Thus delivery retains a role in the law of corporeal moveable property, albeit a 
reduced one. 
 
                                       
* Lecturer in Law, Robert Gordon University. The author acknowledges the helpful comments of 
Professor George Gretton, School of Law, University of Edinburgh, on a draft of this article. Any 
remaining errors remain, of course, the author's responsibility. 
1 See now Sale of Goods Act 1979, s. 17. The 1979 Act replaced the 1893 Act, and is in substantially 
identical terms. Because of the 1893 Act, case law on delivery is generally older.  
2 See eg ss 20(4), 24 and 25 of the 1979 Act. However, for the case where the goods are in the hands of 
a third party, s 29(4) gives a definition of delivery that follows the English rule of attornment, outlined 
below, rather than the general rules of Scots law discussed here, at least in cases where there is no 
document of title. For discussion, see KGC Reid, The Law of Property in Scotland (1996) para 620 
(Gordon). 
3 Thus the creation of a pledge requires delivery. Of course, some securities, such as a floating charge 
or the landlord's hypothec do not require the creditor to possess the property, but that arises from the 
nature of those securities and has nothing to do with the Sale of Goods Acts. 
4 Sale of Goods Act 1979, s 62(4). For discussion of the scope of this provision, see eg GL Gretton, 
"Security over Moveables without Loss of Possession" 1978 SLT (News) 107; GL Gretton, "The 
Concept of Security" in DJ Cusine (ed), A Scots Conveyancing Miscellany (1987) 132-38; WJ Stewart, 
"Sale and Exchange" in Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia vol 20 (1992), para 815;  SC Styles, "Debtor-to-
Creditor Sales and the Sale of Goods Act 1979" 1995 JR 365; DL Carey Miller with D Irvine, 
Corporeal Moveables in Scots Law 2nd edn (2005) paras 11.14, 12.06; Discussion Paper on Moveable 
Transactions (Scot Law Com DP No 151, 2011) paras 6.37-6.44. 
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(2) Forms of delivery 
 
In its simplest form, delivery involves simply the handing over of the goods by the 
transferor to the transferee. However, delivery may take diverse forms. 
Fundamentally, delivery means a giving of possession to the transferee.5 Possession, 
as defined by Stair, means "the holding or detaining of any thing by ourselves, or 
others for our use...[with] the inclination or affection to make use of the thing 
detained".6 As Stair's words indicate, this requirement for holding or detaining can be 
fulfilled through the acts of another acting on the possessor's behalf. Possession held 
in this way is known as civil possession, as opposed to natural possession, which 
arises where possession is held personally. 
If delivery means a giving of possession to the transferee, then delivery may 
be effected by any means by which the transferee may satisfy the requirements of 
possession. Thus, for example, delivery of goods in a locked store may be made by 
delivery of the key, this being known in Roman law as traditio clavium.7 Where the 
goods are already in the custody of the transferee, the physical requirement for 
possession is already met, and so delivery requires only the transferee's intention to 
take possession (traditio brevi manu).8 It appears also that, in certain circumstances, 
delivery may be held to have occurred even though the goods are still in the 
transferor's custody. This is the constitutum possessorium of the Civilian tradition.9 Its 
scope is uncertain, but it appears that it may occur when the transferor's continued 
holding is on some new basis, such as a contract of hire.10 Delivery occurs here 
because the transferor's continued holding is now on the transferee's behalf. The 
transferee thus acquires civil possession through the transferor. 
 As possession may be held civilly, through another's acts, delivery may be 
made to the transferee by handing the goods over to someone acting on the 
                                       
5 Stair, Inst 2.1.8, 3.2.5; Erskine, Inst 2.1.18; Bankton, Inst 2.1.26; Bell, Prin § 1300. For discussion see 
C Anderson, The Physical Element of Possession of Corporeal Moveable Property in Scots Law 
(Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Edinburgh, 2014) 48-55. 
6 Stair, Inst 2.1.17. See also Erskine, Inst 2.1.20; Bankton, Inst 2.1.26. 
7 Bell, Comm I,186-187; W W Buckland, A Text-Book of Roman Law from Augustus to Justinian 3rd 
edn (1975) 227. 
8 Stair, Inst 3.2.5; Erskine, Inst 2.1.19; Bankton, Inst 2.1.23. 
9 WM Gordon, Studies in the Transfer of Property by Traditio (1970) 13-35. The name is derived from 
D.41.2.17.1, but is not itself classical. 
10 Reid, Property (n 2) para 623 (Gordon); Carey Miller with Irvine, Corporeal Moveables (n 4) paras 
8.23-8.25; GCH Paton (ed), Baron David Hume's Lectures, 1786-1822 (Stair Society vols 5, 13, 15, 17, 
18, 19, 1939-1958) vol 3, pp. 251-252; Orr's Tr v Tullis (1870) 8 M 936. 
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transferee's behalf, such as an employee or an agent. As we shall see, this idea has 
been extended to allow delivery of goods held in the custody of a third party, on the 
transferor's instructions, by intimation to that third party custodier. 
 Those forms of delivery that do not involve a direct handing over of the goods 
are often collectively known as "constructive delivery".11 It is with the final form of 
delivery mentioned that this article is concerned, the delivery of goods in third party 
custody by intimation to that custodier. The purpose of this article is to explore the 
background and basis of this form of delivery. 
 
B. BACKGROUND 
 
(1) Historical background 
 
It is a common observation that Scots property law is strongly influenced by Roman 
law,12 and the law of possession is no exception to this.13 Most obviously, we see the 
use of Roman terminology and authority.14 Nonetheless, as Carey Miller says, that 
adoption of terminology does not necessarily mean adoption of substance: "not 
infrequently, an investigation of the law behind the label reveals a distinctive 
solution".15 Indeed, it does seem that, by accepting delivery of goods in the custody of 
a third party, Scots law goes beyond what Roman law accepted as constituting 
delivery. There is no sign that this form of delivery was recognised in Roman law,16 
                                       
11 See e.g. Carey Miller with Irvine, Corporeal Moveables (n 4) para 8.20; AJM Steven, Pledge and 
Lien (2008) paras 6-27 - 6-28. 
12 On this, see e.g. Reid, Property (n 2) para 2; K Reid, "Property Law: Sources and Doctrine" and G 
McLeod, "The Romanization of Property Law" in K Reid & R Zimmermann (eds), A History of Private 
Law in Scotland, Volume 1: Introduction and Property (2000) 192-193 and 220-244 respectively. 
13 Reid, Property (n 2) para 114; Gordon, Traditio (n 9) 210 (on delivery specifically); K Reid, 
"Property Law: Sources and Doctrine" in Reid & Zimmermann, History of Private Law (n 12) 210-212.  
14 For example, all of the references in Stair's general account of possession (Inst 2.1.17-24) are to 
Roman sources, except for a number of Scots cases on bona fide possession cited at Inst 2.1.24. 
Erskine's account of delivery and possession (Inst 2.1.18-30) relies primarily on Roman sources and 
uses Roman terminology. Bankton's account of delivery (Inst 2.1.20, 22-23) refers only to Roman 
authority, as does his general account of possession (Inst 2.1.26-33) except for some Scots cases on the 
possessory judgment at Inst 2.1.33. It is true that, later, Bell's general account of delivery (Comm I,181-
223) makes considerable use of English cases, but  he does still make use of Roman and more recent 
continental literature (Comm I,181 n 3; I,216 n 1, n 2).  
15 DL Carey Miller, "Derivative Acquisition of Moveables" in R Evans-Jones (ed), The Civil Law 
Tradition in Scotland (1995) 129. See also D L Carey Miller, "Stair's Property: A Romanist System?" 
1995 JR 70 at 70-71. 
16 MP Brown, A Treatise on the Law of Sale (1821) 393.  
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nor is it recognised in all modern Civilian systems.17 Even South Africa, whose law is 
so often remarkably similar to Scots law,18 does not accept this form of delivery, 
instead adopting the English requirement that the custodier "attorn" to the transferee 
by consenting to hold on the transferee's behalf, this form of delivery being known as 
attornment.19  
 In Scotland, this form of delivery appears relatively late: in all of the 
institutional writings and other Scots legal literature before Bell, there is only one, 
doubtful, reference to this form of delivery.20  No doubt, at least part of the 
explanation for this is that the development of a legal system responds primarily to the 
practical demands placed on it. If there is no practical demand for the law to 
accommodate a particular development, then there is a good chance that that 
development will not occur. In the case of Scots law, R Brown plausibly attributes the 
impetus behind the development of this form of delivery to the bonding system 
created in the nineteenth century.21 Under this system, goods could be imported 
without payment of the appropriate excise duty, on condition that they were 
warehoused under a double lock, one key being held by the revenue officer, the goods 
only being released on payment of the duty. Physical delivery thus being impossible, 
it was necessary to develop an alternative method. 
 There is, however, a theoretical problem with this form of delivery. It is 
unproblematic that the transferor's possession is held and exercised through the acts of 
another, the custodier. As we have seen, possession may be held civilly, through 
                                       
17 C von Bar & E Clive (eds), Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of European Private Law: Draft 
Common Frame of Reference (6 vols, 2009, hereafter "DCFR") 4539. The DCFR itself makes 
provision in art VIII.-2:105(2) (page 4536), requiring intimation by the transferor to the custodier. 
18 Thus, in the preface to R Zimmermann, D Visser & K Reid (eds), Mixed Legal Systems in 
Comparative Perspective: Property and Obligations in Scotland and South Africa (2004), it is 
observed that "a lawyer from the one jurisdiction feels immediately at home with the law books of the 
other". 
19 CG van der Merwe & MJ de Waal, The Law of Things and Servitudes (1993) para 175; PJ 
Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert, Silberberg & Schoeman's The Law of Property 5th edn (2006), 
para 9.2.3.2(e); DL Carey Miller & A Pope, "Acquisition of Ownership" in R Zimmermann, D Visser 
& K Reid (eds), Mixed Legal Systems in Comparative Perspective: Property and Obligations in 
Scotland and South Africa (2004) 696. On the English law, see e.g. F Pollock & RS Wright, An Essay 
on Possession in the Common Law (1888) 73; Halsbury's Laws of England (4th edn, 2005 reissue), vol 
41 para 170. 
20 Stair, Inst 3.2.5. From its terms, this text appears to refer to cases where the transferor is not in 
possession, whether natural or civil. 
21 R Brown, Treatise on the Sale of Goods, with Special Reference to the Law of Scotland 2nd edn 
(1911) 200 n 2. For an outline of the bonding system and its development, see MP Brown, Sale (n 16) 
528-29; Bell, Comm I,199-211. It does not seem, though, that this system was a novelty. Boccaccio 
describes a similar system in operation in Italian port cities in the fourteenth century: G Boccaccio, 
Decameron (c. 1350, J Payne (tr) 1886, revd C Ó Cuilleanáin 2004) tale VIII.10. 
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another. Such possession is based on the custodier's consent to holding on behalf on 
another, in the present case such consent being expressed in the contractual 
obligations assumed by the custodier with respect to the goods. It is not clear how the 
custodier then comes to hold instead for another, without the custodier's consent to 
that. There does not appear to be any other situation in which I can acquire possession 
merely by instructing the person with custody of my property to hold on my behalf. 
The earliest case on this form of delivery appears to be Main v Maxwell,22 in 
which it was held good delivery that goods in a public weigh-house had been weighed 
out to the buyer and marked as belonging to him. However, the effectiveness of this 
form of delivery was only firmly established by a series of cases in the nineteenth 
century. 
 The first of this series of cases is Mathie's Tr v Auchie, Ure & Co.23 In this 
case, Auchie, Ure & Co imported a quantity of rum, which was deposited in the 
cellars of the Sandemans. There then followed a sale to Mathie, which was intimated 
to the Sandemans, and part of the goods removed. Mathie then became insolvent. It 
was argued for Mathie's trustee that, when Mathie was entered as owner in the 
Sandemans' books, the custodier "ceased to be the agent of the importer, and became 
the agent of the purchaser, whose orders he was bound to obey". The seller could do 
no more at this point to effect delivery, and could be asked to do no more. The trustee 
relied on several Scots cases holding indorsement and delivery of a bill of lading to be 
delivery of goods in transit by sea24 and an English case on stoppage in transitu,25 the 
point being to show that delivery could occur when goods were in the hands of a third 
party. The argument was that delivery occurred when intimation of the sale was made 
to the custodiers, and the custodiers then noted the fact in their warehouse books. The 
trustee was, however, unsuccessful in the Court of Session, although it was not in fact 
held that delivery had not occurred. Instead, the Court of Session appears to have 
accepted an argument based on stoppage in transitu. As stoppage in transitu does not 
                                       
22 (1710) Mor 9124. This case is accepted by MP Brown, Sale (n 16) 527-28 as being a case of this 
kind. 
23 (1804) Mor 14226. 
24 Buchanan & Cochrane v Swan (1764) Mor 14208; Arthur v Hastie & Jamieson (1770) Mor 14209; 
Bogle v Dunmore (1787) Mor 14216. 
25 Ellis v Hunt (1789) 3 Term Rep 464; 100 ER 679. Stoppage in transitu, more commonly known 
nowadays as stoppage in transit, is a right on the part of an unpaid seller to instruct the carrier of goods 
not to hand the goods over to the buyer. It was introduced into Scots law by the House of Lords in 
Allan Stewart & Co v Stein's Creditors (1790) Mor 4951, 3 Pat 191. On the introduction of the doctrine 
into Scots law, see Bell, Comm I,223-39; MP Brown, Sale (n 16) 434. The current law is contained in 
the Sale of Goods Act 1979, ss 44-46. 
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depend on whether delivery has occurred,26 the decision is consistent with the idea 
that delivery may occur by a transfer of civil possession, through intimation to the 
custodier. Equally, though, the Court did not hold that this form of delivery was 
competent. 
 The trustee appealed to the House of Lords. However, before the appeal was 
determined, a decision was made by the Court of Session in another case, more 
supportive of this form of delivery. In Tod & Co v Rattray,27 a quantity of wine was 
imported by Tod & Co and stored in a bonded warehouse. There then followed a 
series of sales, each involving the giving of a delivery order to the buyer, addressed to 
the custodier, each sale being intimated to the revenue officer.28 The final sale was to 
Rattray. The question then arose whether there had been delivery to Rattray. The 
majority held that delivery had occurred. However, the judges' opinions fell into three 
groups. 
 The first group held that Mathie's Tr v Auchie, Ure & Co was wrongly 
decided. The present facts, they held, were equivalent to delivery into a cellar in the 
care of someone hired by the buyer:  
 
the goods remained unmoved, but the right to the cellar, and to the services of 
the keeper, was transferred, so that they were equally put into the civil 
possession of the buyer. 
 
This, then, is a decision that delivery may occur where the goods are in a third party's 
custody.  
 The second group held that Mathie's Tr v Auchie, Ure & Co was correctly 
decided. However, that case, it was held, could be distinguished on the basis of that in 
the present case sub-sales had followed on from the original transaction. By granting a 
delivery order to the first purchaser, Tod & Co had allowed that party to assume the 
appearance of owner of the goods, and so were now personally barred from denying 
that ownership. 
                                       
26 Indeed, it is unnecessary if delivery has not occurred, for then the seller will still be in possession and 
can retain the goods against performance by the buyer. This will be on the basis of the seller's lien if the 
seller is still owner. On the seller's lien, see Sale of Goods Act 1979, ss. 41-43. 
27 1 Feb 1809, FC. 
28 As we shall see, it has subsequently been held that intimation to the revenue officer was not 
sufficient, and that intimation should instead be made to the warehousekeeper. 
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 The third group held that Mathie's Tr v Auchie, Ure & Co was correctly 
decided, taking the view that a delivery order gives only a right to require delivery. 
"Constructive delivery" was considered to be only an "equitable expedient" for the 
purposes of commerce and not to be delivery in the strictest sense. In reaching this 
view, this group referred to two cases of, it must be said, doubtful relevance. The first 
of these was Viscount of Arbuthnott v Paterson.29 In that case, tenants of the Viscount 
of Arbuthnott, who were under an obligation to convey grain to the Viscount, were 
instructed instead to deliver the grain to a third party to whom the Viscount had sold 
the grain. However, as the tenants were owners of the grain until delivery,30 this 
appears to be not a transfer of the Viscount's civil possession - he had no such 
possession - but rather an assignation of a personal right to get delivery from the 
tenants. The second case cited was Collins v Marquis's Creditors,31 which was 
concerned with stoppage in transitu in circumstances where part of a cargo was 
physically delivered to the transferee and part was still in the hands of the carrier. In 
other words, neither case was about delivery at all. 
 Between them, the first and second groups formed a majority. However, the 
disagreement between them meant that the basis of the decision was unclear until the 
appeal in Mathie's Tr v Auchie, Ure & Co was determined by the House of Lords. In 
the event, the House of Lords held that delivery had occurred on the facts stated,32 
reversing the decision of the Court of Session. This position was quickly accepted. 
Thus, for example, in Auld v Hall & Co,33 it was said obiter by the Lord President that 
intimation to the custodier was needed to effect delivery when the goods were held by 
a third party. In Eadie v Mackinlay,34 delivery was denied in the absence of proper 
intimation to the custodier. 
                                       
29 (1798) Mor 14220. 
30 This is because, as "industrial growing crops", i.e. crops requiring annual seed and labour, the crops 
did not accede to the land and thus did not become the property of the owner of the land: Stair, Inst 
2.1.34; Erskine, Inst 2.6.11; Bankton, Inst 2.1.10; Boskabelle Ltd v Laird 2006 SLT 1079. For 
discussion, see DL Carey Miller, "Right to Annual Crops" (2007) 11 Edin LR 274. 
31 (1804) Mor 14223. 
32 Spence v Auchie, Ure & Co (1810) 5 Pat 291. 
33 12 June 1811, FC. 
34 7 Feb 1815, FC. 
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 It is settled, then, that delivery of goods may be made while those goods 
remain in the hands of a third party.35 Before considering the basis of this, however, 
we must consider how this form of delivery operates.36 
 
C. OPERATION 
 
(1) The role of intimation  
 
(a) Intimation must be made. In this form of delivery, intimation to the custodier is 
essential: 
 
delivery was held to have taken place upon acceptance by the holding third 
party of an intimation from the transferor instructing that henceforth the thing 
be held on behalf of the transferee.37 
 
In fact, in the reported cases intimation is typically made by the transferee by means 
of a delivery order addressed by the transferor to the custodier. The practical benefit 
of this approach is obvious: 
 
Where A agrees to transfer the property in goods to B, and the transfer is to be 
effected by constructive delivery, B is the person who has the interest to 
intimate to the custodian the change of possession, because to complete his 
                                       
35 There has been some doubt as to whether this extends to the creation of a right of pledge. In 
Hamilton v Western Bank (1856) 19 D 152 it was held that a pledge could not be created by a transfer 
of civil possession, the result being in fact an outright conveyance, albeit one subject to an obligation to 
reconvey. For criticism of this decision, see AJM Steven, Pledge and Lien (2008), paras 6-21 - 6-26 
and sources cited there. This form of delivery has been held sufficient for the creation of a pledge in 
subsequent cases: see e.g. Inglis v Robertson & Baxter (1898) 25 R (HL) 70; Dobell, Beckett & Co v 
Neilson (1904) 7 F 281; Hayman & Son v M'Lintock 1907 SC 936; Price & Pierce Ltd v Bank of 
Scotland 1910 SC 1095. 
36 In addition to the cases cited below, see also e.g. Marris v White & Mackay (1889) 5 Sh Ct Rep 163, 
although that case was ultimately disposed of on other grounds. 
37 Carey Miller & Pope, "Acquisition of Ownership" (n 19) 696. See also TB Smith, A Short 
Commentary of the Law of Scotland (1962) 539. In fact, it does not appear that any act of acceptance 
by the custodier is required. As Bell says, it is "the notice to the custodier that operates as a transfer of 
the property" (Comm I,194). This is the same in another context in which it is necessary to intimate to a 
third party in order to transfer a right, namely assignation. It is notable here that Carey Miller & Pope 
state that intimation is to be made by the transferor. Ross Anderson appears to consider it doubtful 
whether, in assignations in general, it is competent for intimation to be made by the assignor (RG 
Anderson, Assignation (2008), paras 6-30 - 6-33), although he does cite two cases in which this was 
held to be effective (A v B (1540) Mor 843; Libertas Kommerz GmbH v Johnson 1977 SC 191). 
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right of property he must obtain delivery. But the custodier does not know B; 
he only knows A. Therefore A must enable B to vouch the fact that he is 
authorised to intimate the change of possession. This might be done by A and 
B appearing together at the store and verbal intimation, but it is frequently 
done in writing.38 
 
However intimation is made, though, it must be borne in mind that the function of 
intimation is to allow the party to whom it is made to know to whom he must perform 
his obligations. Accordingly, the intimation must refer to the transfer of the goods. 
Thus, in Eadie v Mackinlay,39 where the transferee merely informed the custodier's 
trustee in sequestration that the custodier held hides belonging to him, this was held 
insufficient intimation. 
Gordon states that the instruction to hold the goods for the transferee must 
actually be received by the custodier.40 Neither of the cases he cites as authority for 
this41 actually says anything on this point, but it seems reasonable to suppose that it is 
the case. 
 
(b) Transferor must not be merely someone with a right to get delivery. Where 
the goods are in the hands of the transferor, an assignation of the transferee's right to 
delivery of the goods will not operate as a delivery of the goods to the assignee. We 
have already seen this point in Viscount of Arbuthnott v Paterson,42 but the same 
point is made obiter in Pochin & Co v Robinows & Marjoribanks.43 In that case, P 
had agreed to buy from a manufacturer a quantity of iron forming part of the 
manufacturer's stock. P then engaged C as an agent to find a purchaser for the iron 
and, on being informed by C that a purchaser had been found, P indorsed the delivery 
order in C's favour. In fact there was no purchaser, and C subsequently sold to R. It 
was observed that the transaction between P and C could only have been an 
assignation of a personal right to delivery of the iron, in part because the iron had not 
                                       
38 NML Walker & JFG Thomson, "Document of Title" in J Wark (ed), Encyclopaedia of the Laws of 
Scotland, vol 6 (1928), para 61. See also Anderson (n 37) para 6-31, where a similar point is made. 
39 7 Feb 1815, FC. 
40 Reid, Property (n 2) para 620 (Gordon). 
41 Tod & Co v Rattray 1 Feb 1809, FC; Auld v Hall & Co 12 June 1811, FC. 
42 (1798) Mor 14220. 
43 (1869) 7 M 622. 
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yet been specifically identified, but also because the custodier was the original 
seller.44 
 It seems that this must be correct. Suppose that A has agreed to convey goods 
to B. If delivery is required for transfer of ownership, and delivery has not been made 
to B, then all that B has acquired is a personal right to get delivery and become owner. 
He is not yet owner. He therefore cannot directly convey ownership to C: nemo dat 
quod non habet. He can certainly assign his personal right to C, but that would not 
constitute delivery to C unless there then followed sufficient acts to constitute 
delivery from A to C. There is thus a distinction to be made between a party who has 
lodged his own property in the safekeeping of another, and one who has agreed to 
acquire property belonging to that other. It is true that this distinction has not always 
been clearly observed.45 For example, in Auld v Hall & Co,46 on facts essentially 
identical to those just described, it seems to have been accepted that there had been 
delivery from A to B, the subsequent delivery from B to C failing only for want of 
intimation. Nonetheless, the point seems clear. 
 That being the case, it is surprising that it caused such difficulty in Distillers 
Co Ltd v Dawson.47 In that case, a distiller had sold a quantity of whisky, but had kept 
it in its own warehouse. There then followed over a period of six years a number of 
sub-sales, each intimated to the distiller but in each case the whisky remaining in the 
distiller's custody. The final purchaser became bankrupt, whereupon ownership of the 
whisky was disputed. In the Inner House the majority48 took the position adopted here 
that, no delivery having been made to the first purchaser, all that could be conveyed 
by the first purchaser was a personal right to take delivery and become owner.  
 However, the Lord Ordinary and, in the Inner House, Lord Mure, took a 
position that is, with respect, difficult to follow. They both seem to accept that there 
was no delivery to the first purchaser, but hold that there had been delivery to 
                                       
44 The point is most clearly made by the Lord President, at 629. 
45 The Scottish courts, it must be said, are not the first to fail to make the distinction clear. See for 
example S Pufendorf, De Jure Naturae et Gentium Libri Octo, Volume Two: The Translation of the 
Edition of 1688 (CH Oldfather & WA Oldfather (trs), 1934) 4.9.9, where it is said that a "fictitious 
delivery of possession also takes place between three persons by delegation, when, for instance, a man 
wishes to give me something, or owes it, and I order him to give it to another. For that is the same as if 
the thing had first been given to me, and then handed over by me to a third party". As it is made clear 
that delivery must be made to me to make me owner, for this passage to make sense delivery must also 
have been made to the third party. This, however, is not stated: all we are told is that the order has been 
given for delivery to the third party. 
46 12 June 1811, FC. 
47 (1889) 16 R 479. For discussion see note by HG at (1889) 1 JR 228. 
48 The Lord President and Lords Adam and Kinnear. 
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subsequent purchasers. It is difficult to see how this could be the case, given that, as 
Lord Kinnear pointed out,49 the sub-purchasers had done no more than the original 
purchasers. 
 In fact, given that warehouse rent was paid to the distillers by the purchasers 
and sub-purchasers for storage of the whisky, there was scope for an argument based 
on constitutum possessorium. Although he does not use the phrase, this appears to be 
the basis of Lord Shand's view as part of the minority: 
 
Constructive delivery is complete by payment, followed by the new contract 
or arrangement made with the seller, which entirely changes his title to the 
goods from one of property to one of depositary, hirer, or otherwise.50 
 
Unfortunately, there is little analysis of the position, and he appears to consider this to 
be an exception to the delivery requirement rather than an example of delivery.51 
 This requirement, while its theoretical justification is clear, may reasonably be 
seen as the most problematic aspect in practical terms of this form of delivery, in that 
it makes the transferee's position depend on matters of which he is likely to have no 
knowledge. The transferee may not know whether the transferor has actually had 
delivery or is merely someone with a personal right to get delivery. This is especially 
so in a case such as Browne & Co v Ainslie & Co,52 the transferor has sought (for 
commercial reasons) to conceal the facts on that point.53 Again, where goods 
delivered in this way are then conveyed to another person, the subsequent acquirer 
may not know whether the first acquirer himself intimated to the custodier. In such a 
case, the subsequent acquirer would arguably acquire ownership by accretion on  
                                       
49 (1889) 16 R 479, 501. 
50 (1889) 16 R 479, 495. 
51 Thus, at 494, he says that "the brocard traditionibus non nudis pactis transferuntur rerum dominia 
[has] no proper application" in cases of this kind. It may also be noted in passing that Lord Shand's 
view (at 496) that momentary possession by the transferee, followed immediately by return to the 
transferor on the basis of custody, would sufficient, does not seem to be supported by the authorities. 
Such attempts to circumvent the delivery requirement have typically been seen as shams and denied 
effect: Taylor v Jack (1821) 1 S 139; Stiven v Cowan (1878) 15 SLR 422. Compare Eadie v Young 
(1815) Hume 705, in which such an arrangement was upheld, but which arguably met the requirements 
for a constitutum possessorium. 
52 (1893) 21 R 173. 
53 (1893) 21 R 173 at 176-177. The reason for the concealment was that the purchasers, a London 
company, wanted to appear to be Scottish in order to assist in the resale of the goods, a quantity of 
Scotch whisky. 
12 
 
making intimation himself,54 assuming the case was one in which delivery was 
required, but that would still involve the complication that the custodier would not 
know about the previous conveyance, and so would be reluctant to hand over the 
goods to the final acquirer. However, the position seems clear. 
 
D. BASIS OF DELIVERY BY INTIMATION TO A THIRD PARTY 
CUSTODIER 
 
It appears, then, that delivery of goods in the custody of a third party may be made by 
intimation to that third party. The goods need not be removed from the third party's 
custody. Unfortunately, while this much is clear, the basis of the recognition of this 
form of delivery is less clear. Three possibilities have been suggested. 
 
(1) Expansion of rule for bills of lading  
 
Where goods are being transported by sea, delivery of the goods may be made by 
delivery of a bill of lading issued by the carrier to the shipper.55 It has been suggested 
that delivery by intimation to a third party custodier is a development of this rule.56 
There is indeed some similarity, with a delivery order addressed to the custodier 
normally taking the place of the bill of lading. For this view, it may be noted that, in 
Mathie's Tr v Auchie, Ure & Co,57 the argument in the Court of Session for the 
ultimately-successful trustee was largely based on cases on bills of lading. However, 
this cannot be conclusive. At this point, these cases were almost the only authorities 
that could be argued to be relevant to the question. As we have seen, there were no 
cases directly in point, so it is hardly surprising that counsel for the trustee seized on 
them. This, however, was not the ultimate basis for the decision in the House of 
Lords.  
The argument that this form of delivery is derived from the practice on bills of 
lading faces the difficulty that no notice to the custodier is required in the case of a 
bill of lading, contrary to the requirements for the form of delivery with which we are 
                                       
54 Reid, Property (n 2) paras 677-678. 
55 Reid, Property (n 2) para 621 (Gordon). 
56 MJ King, "Moveables (Delivery of)" in J Wark (ed), Encyclopaedia of the Laws of Scotland, vol 10 
(1930), para 240; R Brown, Sale (n 17) 206. 
57 (1804) Mor 14226. 
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concerned. For R Brown, the reason for the difference is that a bill of lading is issued 
by the custodier, the carrier of the goods. In other cases, the custodier is not involved 
in the issue of a delivery order. The owner may have issued several delivery orders, 
but the custodier can only be bound to implement the first presented to him: 
 
The custodier cannot be held responsible for loss arising from his acting on the 
instructions of the only owner he knows - the only person to whom under his 
contract he has rendered himself responsible.58 
 
However, much the same can be said of bills of lading issued in sets, as indeed Brown 
notes.59 He considers, however, that the issue of bills in sets is less likely to lead to 
fraud on account of three factors.60 
 First, he says, the goods are at sea and so incapable of actual delivery. 
However, it may be suggested that, if anything, this is more likely to lead to fraud 
rather than less, as (at least in the days before modern communications) fraudulent 
multiple sales would be less likely to be prematurely exposed by purchasers 
contacting the carrier. 
 Second, Brown notes that a bill of lading also embodies the contract of 
carriage: "[a] contract to which third persons are parties is not exposed to the same 
risk of fraudulent duplication."61 He does not, however, explain why this should be 
the case. 
 Third, bills issued in sets state that fact and the number issued, "which, to 
some extent, puts an indorsee upon enquiry."62 This, however, is a weak protection at 
best. As Brown himself says,63 it is only necessary to present one of a set of bills of 
lading, performance of which by the carrier cancels the others. 
In addition, on Brown's view it ought to be the case that intimation is not 
required where the custodier has been a party to the issue of the delivery order. 
Indeed, Brown goes further, appearing to suggest that it should be enough just to 
intimate the first transfer, "for the custodier knows that he is holding the goods under 
a delivery order which is still in currency and that it is at his peril if he delivers the 
                                       
58 R Brown, Sale (n 21) 199. 
59 ibid. 
60 ibid. 
61 ibid. 
62 ibid. 
63 ibid 198 n 8. 
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goods to anyone who does not deliver up the order duly indorsed to the presenter".64 
There is, however, no trace in the case law of such a rule. 
 
(2) Traditio longa manu 
 
 Roman law recognised a form of delivery, known as traditio longa manu, that 
involved "pointing out the thing to the transferee, and authorising him to take it, in 
such conditions that it was in his immediate power to do so".65 Examples in the texts 
include delivery of objects too heavy to move66 by pointing them out67 and the giving 
of possession of land by pointing it out from a tower.68 
 Gordon suggests that delivery by the transfer of civil possession is a form of 
delivery longa manu, as a "development of the principle implicit in D.46.3.79".69 
This, a passage from Javolenus, reads as follows: 
 
Should I direct you to put money or anything else which you owe me where I 
can see it, the result is that you are released at once and that it becomes mine. 
For in such a case, no one else having physical control of the thing, it is 
acquired by me, and in a sense, there is deemed to be a delivery by the long 
hand. 
 
According to Gordon, the principle implicit in this passage is that "there is delivery by 
giving instructions which put the thing out of the control of the present possessor and 
into the control of the acquirer".70 Carey Miller, although considering the needs of 
commerce to have been the main factor in the development of this form of delivery, 
finds Gordon's view: 
 
                                       
64 ibid 199. 
65 Buckland (n 7) 227. See also JAC Thomas, Textbook of Roman Law (1976) 182;; M Kaser, Das 
Römische Privatrecht 2nd edn (2 vols, 1971-1975) vol 1, 391. 
66 Presumably by this Paul means merely that the item is too heavy to be readily moved, rather than it 
being literally incapable of movement. 
67 Paul, D.41.2.1.21. Paul also includes here delivery of wine kept in a locked cellar by delivery of the 
keys. 
68 Celsus, D.41.2.18.2. It is questionable whether this would be recognised as sufficient in Scots law, 
given that there is no actual exercise of control here. 
69 Reid, Property (n 2) para 620 (Gordon); Gordon, Traditio (n 9) 217. 
70 Gordon, Traditio (n 9) 217. 
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plausible on the basis that the giving of the instructions to a third party is an 
obvious possible extension of the notion of delivery by an act which brings 
about a shift of control from transferor to transferee.71 
 
However, although the phrase manu longa tradita is used by Javolenus, the example 
he gives seems more like a normal delivery of direct control if, as Thomas reasonably 
assumes,72 this takes place within the creditor's own premises. In other words, 
Javolenus seems to be concerned with a quite different situation. The other texts 
identified as relating to traditio longa manu seem to relate to cases where, at best, 
there is not so much a taking of control by the transferee as there is a permission to 
take control. 
 Gordon is not alone in identifying this form of delivery with traditio longa 
manu. In the Netherlands and Belgium, for example, this form of delivery is 
recognised and is given this name.73 However the situation may be for those 
countries, though, it is not clear that in Scots law there is any sound basis for 
believing this form of delivery to be derived from traditio longa manu. For one thing, 
the requirement to intimate to the custodier distinguishes this form of delivery from 
the traditio longa manu. No such requirement appears in the Roman sources, either 
for the traditio longa manu or the traditio clavium, which Gordon considers to be a 
form of traditio longa manu.74 In the case of a traditio clavium, the goods may 
nonetheless have some sort of custodian, perhaps the keeper of a warehouse 
containing the area in which the goods are locked. Nonetheless, it does not appear that 
intimation to that custodian is required in the case of a traditio clavium. If both that 
and the present form of delivery are examples of traditio longa manu, there seems to 
be no obvious reason why, in the former case, the handing over of a delivery order to 
the transferee should not be enough, without any requirement for intimation. It is also 
notable that there is no reference in the case law to this form of delivery being based 
on traditio longa manu. Of course, this factor should not be given too much weight: 
the term constitutum possessorium does not seem ever to have been used by a Scottish 
court, but as we have seen that form of delivery has certainly been recognised at least 
                                       
71 Carey Miller, "Derivative Acquisition" (n 15) 150. Indeed, Gordon's position on this point is adopted 
by Carey Miller & Pope, "Acquisition of Ownership" (n 19) 696. 
72 Thomas (n 65) 182, referring in error to D.46.3.75. 
73 DCFR 4555. 
74 Reid, Property (n 2) para 620 (Gordon); Traditio (n 9) 216. 
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to some extent. Nonetheless, it is a factor that is at least unsupportive of Gordon's 
view. Nor is there any evidence that, when the present form of delivery came to be 
recognised, it was seen as being based on traditio longa manu. Indeed, M P Brown, 
writing only a few years after Mathie's Tr v Auchie, Ure & Co and Tod & Co v 
Rattray, suggests that traditio longa manu is not recognised at all in Scotland, even 
while referring in the same paragraph to the acceptance of the present form of 
delivery.75 
 
(3) Assignation of custodier's duty 
 
There is an alternative view which, arguably, better explains the position reached by 
the law on this point. Suppose that I have a personal right against someone, entitling 
me to enforce a duty owed to me by that person. From my point of view, that right is 
an asset that normally76 may be conveyed to another by the process of assignation. 
Suppose I want to assign a right to payment of a sum of money. When the assignation 
is intimated to the debtor, the assignee steps into my shoes and becomes the creditor. 
The duty to pay is no longer owed to me, but to the assignee. 
 What if, instead, the duty to be assigned is a duty to hold goods on my behalf? 
As long as this duty is owed to the party who originally placed the goods in the 
custodier's hands, the custodier has no authority to deliver the goods to anyone else 
without consent, even a known purchaser.77 The custodier's position is determined by 
the contract in terms of which he holds the goods, and the possessor retains 
possession because of the contractual duties owed to him. Does it then follow that, if 
those contractual duties are assigned to another, the assignee will acquire possession? 
 Although the Scots law of possession is influenced by Roman law, Roman law 
did not recognise that delivery could occur when the goods were held by a third party. 
Nor did Roman law recognise the assignation of personal rights.78 From these facts, 
                                       
75 MP Brown, Sale (n 16) 392-393. 
76 There are some restrictions. For example, alimentary rights may not be assigned, nor may rights in 
respect of which there is delectus personae. For discussion, see Anderson, (n 37) paras 10-31 - 10-32. 
77 Smith v Allan & Poynter (1859) 22 D 208. 
78 An obligation was seen as personal to the parties. It was possible for a creditor to authorise another to 
enforce a claim in his own name (procuratio in rem suam), but in principle the identity of the creditor 
did not change. Post-classical modifications did, however, give to this arrangement much of the 
practical effect of an assignation. For a full account of these developments, see R Zimmermann, The 
Law of Obligations: Roman Foundations of the Civilian Tradition (1990) 58-67; Anderson (n 37), 
chapter 4. 
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we can legitimately draw certain inferences. The first of these is that the form of 
delivery presently under consideration does not follow obviously from the nature of 
delivery. If this form of delivery is now recognised (as it is), it is not improbable that 
this recognition stems from a post-Roman development, which may not be present to 
the same extent, or at all, in all countries. Assignation of personal rights is, as 
mentioned, such a development. It operates differently in different countries: not all 
legal systems require intimation to complete an assignation, for example.79 We should 
therefore expect variation in the rules of different legal systems. Some Civilian legal 
systems may decline to recognise delivery in these circumstances, while others will 
have found sufficient justification for the contrary position. Among those legal 
systems that recognise this form of delivery, different justifications may have been 
found. 
 In fact, this is exactly what we find. Some Civilian legal systems do not 
recognise this form of delivery at all, while its basis and operation differ between 
those systems in which it is recognised.80 Among those systems recognising delivery 
of goods in the custody of a third party, it appears to operate either by some kind of 
notice or order to the custodier, or by assignation of the transferor's contractual right 
against the custodier.81 Thus, in Germany, when a thing is in the custody of a third 
party, delivery can take place if the owner assigns his "claim to delivery of the 
thing".82  
 The view then would be that this form of delivery operates, not directly by a 
transfer of control, but by a transfer of personal rights against the person who has that 
control. There is nothing in this idea that is novel or unique to Scotland, as we have 
seen. This is certainly the way that Bell appears to see the matter: this form of 
delivery operates, he says, by a "complete transfer of the custodier's duty".83 In other 
words, delivery happens because the right to enforce that duty has been assigned to 
                                       
79 For an overview of the requirements of European jurisdictions, see DCFR 1020-24. Along with 
Scotland, intimation is also required to complete an assignation in France. 
80 DCFR 4539. 
81 DCFR 4539. In Scotland, of course, the requirement for intimation to complete an assignation of a 
personal right would mean that, if assignation is the basis for this form of delivery, Scots law would fit 
into both of those categories. 
82 BGB, s. 931. See also BGB, s. 870. For discussion, see LPW van Vliet, Transfer of Movables in 
German, French, English and Dutch Law (2000) 55-60, DCFR 4551. 
83 Bell, Prin § 1305. See also Bell, Comm I,194. 
18 
 
the transferee. Likewise, in Tod & Co v Rattray,84 the view that was accepted as 
representing the law was that: 
 
the goods remained unmoved, but the right to the cellar, and to the services of 
the keeper, was transferred, so that they were equally put into the civil 
possession of the buyer.  
 
If the seller had demanded access to the goods, the custodier would have been entitled 
to refuse, but the buyer was entitled to such access, because the personal rights held 
by the seller had been assigned to the buyer. Just as the seller's continued civil 
possession had been based on those personal rights against the custodier, the buyer's 
acquisition of possession was based on those same personal rights. 
 Again, later, in Inglis v Robertson & Baxter,85 Lord Watson expressly said 
that the transferee must make "such intimation of his right to the custodier as will 
make it the legal duty of the latter to hold the goods for him". The transfer, thus, is not 
directly of ownership, but of the personal right against the custodier on the basis of 
which the custodier is under a duty to hold the goods for the owner. This transfer of 
the personal right changes the identity of the person for whom the custodier holds 
and, on the argument given above, changes the person who has civil possession. By 
thus changing who has possession, delivery, and therefore the transfer of ownership, 
is operated. 
 McLaren, in a note in the seventh edition of Bell's Commentaries, suggests 
that the idea of delivery by intimation arose by "confounding a delivery order with an 
assignation."86 Although he is critical of this idea, he finds some support for it in the 
case law,87 and holds that otherwise "there appears to be no legal ground for holding 
that mere notice or intimation to a non-assenting creditor should operate a change of 
constructive possession from vendor to vendee".88 Again, R Brown finds it "natural 
and proper" that intimation should be adopted as a requirement, by analogy with 
assignation.89 
                                       
84 1 Feb 1809, FC. 
85 (1898) 25 R (HL) 70, 74. 
86 Bell, Comm I,195 (note). 
87 The cases he refers to are Pochin v Robinow & Marjoribanks (1869) 7 M 622 and Hamilton v 
Western Bank (1856) 19 D 152. 
88 Bell, Comm I,195 (note). 
89 R Brown, Sale (n 21) 208 n 2. 
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 The use of the term "intimation" also suggests a link with assignation. 
Intimation, at least in the context of assignation, is a somewhat technical term and 
does not mean simply notification.90 
 All of this is suggestive that the assignation of personal rights against the 
custodier is the most plausible candidate as the basis for this form of delivery. This 
avoids the theoretical objections that have led to the rejection of this form of delivery 
in South Africa. South African law has adopted the English requirement for 
attornment, referred to earlier, the acceptance by the custodier that he now holds for 
the transferee. The assignation approach has been rejected in South Africa on the 
basis that only incorporeals can be assigned, not ownership.91 In the suggested Scots 
approach, by contrast, there is no attempt to assign ownership directly. Instead, what 
is assigned is the personal right forming the basis of the transferor's civil possession.92 
 The difficulty with this view becomes apparent, however, on consideration of 
the law on assignation of personal rights. Delivery of this form is most commonly 
carried out by the delivery to the transferee of a delivery order, addressed by the 
transferor to the custodier, this delivery order then being intimated to the custodier. It 
does not seem that there can be any objection to the delivery order as a deed of 
assignation. Even if the delivery order is not drafted in terms of an assignation, it has 
been held that the intention to assign a personal right may be implied.93 Even if this 
has been doubted,94 the requirements are not particularly stringent, with no need for 
particular words.95 For example, in Brownlie v Robb,96 the words "I...hand over my 
life policy to my daughter" were held sufficient to constitute an assignation. The Lord 
Justice-Clerk said in Carter v McIntosh97 that "any words giving authority or 
directions, which if fairly carried out will operate a transference, are sufficient to 
make an assignation". A delivery order, being an instruction to the custodier to hold 
                                       
90 P Nienaber & G Gretton, "Assignation/Cession" in Zimmermann et al (n 16) 802. 
91 Silberberg & Schoeman, para 9.2.3.2(f); Absa Bank Ltd v Myburgh 2001 (2) SA 462. 
92 This assumes, of course, that the transferor does have a personal right against the custodier. 
Normally there will be such a right, on the basis of a contract between transferor and custodier, but this 
need not be the case. It is doubtful whether this form of delivery would be possible in the absence of 
such a right. 
93 Lombard North Central Ltd v Lord Advocate 1983 SLT 361. 
94 Reid, Property (n 2) para 655; KGC Reid, "Unintimated Assignations" 1989 SLT (News) 267. 
95 Indeed, it appears that writing is no longer required for a valid assignation of a personal right: 
Requirements of Writing (Scotland) Act 1995, s. 1. For discussion of this point, see Scottish Law 
Commission, Discussion Paper on Moveable Transactions (DP 151, 2011) paras 4.29-4.31. 
96 1907 SC 1302. 
97 (1862) 24 D 925. 
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the goods henceforth for the transferee, would certainly seem to meet this 
requirement. 
 Any objection must therefore be that there is insufficient intimation. 
Intimation at common law was done notarially.98 Section 2 of the Transmission of 
Moveable Property (Scotland) Act 1862 introduced a less cumbersome form of 
notarial execution and also an alternative method, involving the posting of a copy of 
the assignation to the debtor. However, delivery by intimation to a third party 
custodier was established before the 1862 Act, and so its identification with 
assignation of personal rights must stand or fall according to what the common law 
required.  
There is no evidence that intimation to the custodier in these circumstances 
has ever been done by common law notarial intimation. However, while it is not 
enough for the debtor merely to be aware of the assignation,99 the common law has 
also accepted the effectiveness of various substitutes for formal intimation. Where the 
debtor acts in such a way as to acknowledge the intimation, there is correspondence 
between the assignee and the debtor acknowledging the assignation, or where the 
assignee initiates court proceedings to enforce the obligation, it is accepted that the 
right has been validly assigned.100 However, except for the last, which would rarely 
be relevant in a case of the kind we are concerned with, these require some action on 
the part of the debtor. Of course, in the case of delivery of goods in the custody of a 
third party, it would be normal and sensible for the custodier to acknowledge the 
intimation of the transfer and make a record of it. As we have seen, however, this 
does not seem to be required. In fact, the requirements outlined above for this form of 
delivery appear to fall well below the common law requirements for intimation to 
complete an assignation. On the other hand, with this form of delivery we are 
concerned with quite a different situation, which falls far outside the normal case of 
assignation of the right to payment of a debt. In the normal case, assignation will 
create a legal relationship between assignee and debtor which goes beyond the 
obligation merely to hold, for safekeeping, goods belonging to the assignee. It is of no 
great concern to the custodier for whom he holds the goods, and the ownership 
position is certainly of little concern to the custodier. Regardless of whether 
                                       
98 See Anderson (n 37) paras 6-22 - 6-23 for an account of the procedure. 
99 ibid paras 6-21 - 6-29. 
100 ibid paras 7-11 - 7-23. 
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ownership was transferred, assuming his fee was paid the custodier would have no 
reason, and no right, to refuse to hand over the goods to anyone presenting a delivery 
order addressed to the custodier by the party with whom he had originally contracted. 
Equally, it is quite possible that goods kept under these circumstances may be 
conveyed to other parties several times before the custodier is finally expected to give 
natural possession of them. To require formal intimation each time would be unduly 
cumbersome. It is no great stretch of the imagination to suppose that the courts took 
the opportunity to create a new form of intimation, to allow delivery in these 
circumstances in a way that met the needs of commerce. This argument is hardly 
conclusive. While there is some support for it in the relevant literature and in judicial 
dicta, the issue never seems to have been directly addressed or considered in detail. 
However, in light of the relevant literature and authorities, it seems at least arguable 
that this is indeed the basis of this form of delivery. 
 
E. CONCLUSION 
 
It is clear that, according to the common law, delivery of goods may be made by 
intimation to a third party who has custody of the goods. What is less clear is the basis 
on which such delivery operates. This article has attempted to outline the operation of 
this form of delivery, with a view to determining its basis. Suggestions of roots in the 
law of bills of lading or traditio longa manu do not seem to be borne out. Much more 
promising is the suggestion that this form of delivery is based on an assignation of the 
transferor's personal right against the custodier. On this argument, the custodier then 
ceases to hold the goods for the transferor and begins to hold them for the transferee. 
As a result, the transferee acquires civil possession of the goods and delivery is 
complete. 
 This view is, however, faced with the difficulty that the requirements adopted 
in this form of delivery do not appear to comply with the common law requirements 
for intimation of an assignation. It is suggested, however, that while this means that 
the suggestion must necessarily be tentative in the absence of more direct support, this 
is not necessarily an insuperable objection. 
 If this is the correct view, a final point may be noted. It has been argued here 
that intimation to the custodier is needed because intimation is needed to complete an 
assignation of a personal right (in this case, the transferor's contractual rights against 
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the custodier). The Scottish Law Commission has raised the possibility of abolition of 
the intimation requirement in assignations.101 If this change was to be made, it would 
be undesirable if this made an unintended change to the law on delivery of goods. 
Regardless of whether the intimation requirement is desirable in this form of delivery, 
it raises different practical issues and should be considered separately. Accordingly, it 
is suggested that, in any abolition of the intimation requirement in the assignation of 
personal rights generally, it should be made clear that delivery by intimation to a third 
party custodier is not affected. 
 
                                       
101 Scottish Law Commission, Moveable Transactions (n 95) paras 14.5-14.12. 
